

# 2020年度北海学園大学大学院経営学研究科博士(後期)課程入学試験

## 英語(組織経営)

【問1】下記の英文をすべて訳しなさい。

I begin this exploration of the dynamic capabilities framework by summarizing my current thinking on its nature. The framework is most relevant in the growing number of “ecosystems” characterized by what D’Aveni (1994) called hyper-competition, or what I call dynamic competition or “next-generation competition”. The framework has been deepened in ways that make linkage to other concepts in strategic management and economics more apparent. After more carefully describing how I use the terms ordinary and dynamic capabilities, I return to a discussion of the validity of the framework as an analytic lens into the activities of organizations.

A capability, ordinary or dynamic, can be harnessed, against the opposition of circumstance, to produce desirable outcomes. It is distinct from an organization’s intentions, motivations, or strategy. Capabilities are not appropriately summarized by a production function because capabilities are what the organization could accomplish, not necessarily what it is currently producing. Capabilities arise in part from learning, from organizational resources, and from organizational histories. They are untethered from particular purposes or products. For example, a capability to make machines powered by small, compact internal combustion engines can manifest itself in the manufacturing of automobiles, outboard (boat) motors, or tractors and lawn mowers.

Dynamic capabilities govern other organizational activities. They can allow an enterprise to generate superior profits by developing and producing differentiated products and services that address new and existing markets where demand is robust. They enable the firm to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external resources to maintain leadership in continually shifting business environments. Strong dynamic capabilities enable the firm to produce not just the best of a product type, but something that is unique and exceptional in the value it provides to the buyer and the return it generates for the shareholder and other stakeholders.

But strong dynamic capabilities alone are unlikely to result in competitive advantage. Difficult to imitate (idiosyncratic) resources and good strategy are necessary, too. Thus, combined, the strength of a firm’s dynamic capabilities determines the speed and degree to which the firm’s idiosyncratic resources can be aligned and realigned consistent with the firm’s strategy.

【問2】下記の英文をすべて訳しなさい。

In the past decade, a growing body of research has examined how organizations can both explore and exploit. One promising stream of research has focused on how dynamic capabilities may underpin the ability of firms to sense, seize, and reconfigure organizational assets to adapt to changed environmental conditions. With dynamic capabilities, sustained competitive advantage comes from the firm’s ability to leverage and reconfigure its existing competencies and assets in ways that are valuable to the customer but difficult for competitors to imitate. In this view, dynamic capabilities are embedded in organizational processes or routines around coordination, learning, and transformation and allow a firm to sense opportunities and then to seize them by successfully allocating resources, often by adjusting existing competencies or developing new ones. These capabilities underpin the organization’s ability to maintain ecological fitness and, when necessary, to reconfigure existing assets and develop the new skills needed to address emerging threats and opportunities.

O’Reilly and Tushman argue that the ability of a firm to be ambidextrous is at the core of dynamic capabilities. Ambidexterity requires senior managers to accomplish two critical tasks. First, they must be able to accurately sense changes in their competitive environment, including potential shifts in technology, competition, customers, and regulation. Second, they must be able to act on these opportunities and threats; to be able to seize them by reconfiguring both tangible and intangible assets to meet new challenges. As a dynamic capability, ambidexterity embodies a complex set of routines including decentralization, differentiation, targeted integration, and the ability of senior leadership to orchestrate the complex trade-offs that the simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploitation requires. Developing these dynamic capabilities is a central task of executive leadership.

【問 3】 【問 3-1】 か 【問 3-2】 のどちらかを選択しなさい。

【問 3-1】 下記の英文をすべて訳しなさい。

One foundational insight from the study of organizations is that different organizational forms are associated with different strategies and environmental conditions. For example, in a seminal study of innovation. Burns and Stalker (1961) noted that firms operating in stable environments developed what they referred to as "mechanistic management systems" that were characterized by clear hierarchical relations, well-defined roles and responsibilities, and clear job descriptions. In contrast, firms operating in more turbulent environments developed more "organic" systems with a lack of formally defined tasks, more lateral coordination mechanisms, and less reliance on formalization and specialization. Subsequent research has confirmed this insight, and researchers now largely accept that different structural alignments are associated with different strategies and environments.

Building on this insight, studies of organizational adaptation have argued that for firms to succeed over time and in the face of environmental and technological change may require them to change these structure alignments. Thompson (1967) characterized this trade-off between efficiency and flexibility as a paradox of administration. In a seminal article, James March (1991) noted that the fundamental adaptive challenge facing firms was the need to both exploit existing assets and capabilities and to provide for sufficient exploration to avoid being rendered irrelevant by changes in markets and technologies. In his view, exploitation was about efficiency, control, certainty, and variance reduction, while exploration was about search, discovery, autonomy, and innovation. In March's view, "the basic problem confronting an organization is to engage in sufficient exploitation to ensure its current viability and, at the same time, devote enough energy to exploration to ensure its future viability", The difficulty in achieving this balance is a bias in favor of exploitation with its greater certainty of short-term success. Exploration, by its nature, is inefficient and is associated with an unavoidable increase in the number of bad ideas. Yet, without some effort toward exploration, firms, in the face of change, are likely to fail. Based on the idea that different structures are required for exploitation and exploration, several authors suggested that for long-term survival, organizations needed to accommodate both. For instance, in the first use of the term "ambidextrous," Duncan (1976) argued that firms needed to shift structures to initiate and, in turn, execute innovation. After reviewing how some firms managed to survive and change over decades, Tushman and O'Reilly (1996) proposed that organizations needed to explore and exploit simultaneously, to be ambidextrous. This observation has led to a very large number of empirical studies exploring whether ambidexterity is, as the theory suggests, associated with organizational performance and survival; whether ambidexterity is, as originally suggested, accomplished through architecturally separate units or via other means; under what conditions ambidexterity seems most useful; and how ambidexterity is achieved. Its theoretical underpinnings have also been elaborated on using theories as disparate as absorptive capacity, dynamic capabilities, and organizational learning. Unfortunately, as Nosella and colleagues (2012) pointed out, this proliferation of interest has also blurred some of the initial clarity about the definition of organizational ambidexterity and diminished its potential as a capability for resolving the tensions between exploration and exploitation.

【問 3-2】 下記の英文（タイトルも含む）をすべて訳しなさい。

#### **FOUR BEHAVIORS OF GREAT EXECUTIVE ASSISTANTS (EAs)**

EAs play a vital role in shielding CEOs from distractions and unnecessary activities and ensuring that leaders' limited time is used well. We often hear CEOs say that a highly skilled EA can dramatically increase their efficiency and effectiveness, and our research supports that view. EAs often feel conflicting pressures, however, that can result in poor scheduling choices. For instance, although they may recognize that CEOs need time alone, our study shows that many EAs believe that a full CEO calendar signals that they're doing their job. They tend to book back-to-back appointments, limiting time for spontaneous communications or solitary reflection. In addition, while EAs recognize that protecting a CEO's time is one of their most important duties, some have a human reluctance to say no to people (especially colleagues in the organization).

That allows unessential meetings to creep into the CEO's day. Conversely, other EAs take their traditional role as gatekeeper too far, maintaining such tight control over access that their bosses risk being seen as aloof or inaccessible. Finding the right balance in managing the CEO's time requires judgment and emotional intelligence. It also requires strong communication skills, because an EA speaks for the CEO and can affect how a leader comes across. In our research we have identified four key behaviors that drive better performance:

**Understand the leader's agenda.** CEOs should have a written agenda detailing their top priorities (updated quarterly) and should spend much of their time on activities that advance the agenda. It's critical that the EA internalize this agenda and use it as a lens through which each meeting request is viewed. The CEO's responsibility is to ensure that the EA knows the agenda and the importance of keeping the schedule aligned with it.

**Include all the relevant players.** Managers at all levels tend to complain about having too many meetings. One solution is to try keeping meetings small and inviting only those whose attendance is essential. However, good CEOs delegate well, and to do so they need their direct reports and affected managers to be present. Otherwise, extra rounds of communication and follow-up will be needed after meetings. Good EAs avoid that problem by getting the right players in the room to begin with.

**Recognize the value of spontaneity.** Most CEOs are overbooked. They would benefit from more time to walk the hallways and initiate unplanned interactions. They also need room to react to events that can't be anticipated; leaving some open time in the leader's day will help EAs avoid frequently canceling and rescheduling appointments.

**Zealously protect personal and family time.** EAs should recognize that the long hours, travel, and stress of the CEO job can take a toll. Time with family and friends, regular exercise, and opportunities to recharge and reflect are crucial to effectiveness and avoiding burnout. EAs' daily scheduling choices play an important part in helping CEOs maintain the balance they need to succeed over the long haul.